Distributed generation after 2029 and the definition of the economic value of energy compensation.

1. Introduction

Distributed generation projects can produce economic effects over periods that extend beyond the legal transition. Therefore, feasibility analysis requires understanding the future tariff treatment of the SCEE (Electric Energy Compensation System).

The problem investigated is to identify which elements of this treatment are already enshrined in legislation and which depend on regulatory decisions, so that the outcome of each investment can be verifiably estimated.

This research is qualitative, legal, and documentary in nature. The updated text of Law No. 14.300/2022, CNPE Resolution No. 2/2024, and SEI Technical Note No. 958/2026/MF were examined. The documentary scope ends on October 14, 2026. No empirical survey of power plants or estimates of future tariffs were conducted; the economic and contractual recommendations constitute an authorial analysis, not statistical results.

The consultation carried out did not allow confirmation of the final act of ANEEL (National Electric Energy Agency) that approves the complete methodology for applying article 17 by the cutoff date. This limitation prevents stating a definitive value for 2029. The examination therefore adopts the legal commands and guidelines verified, qualifying the alternatives discussed as proposals, without presupposing their approval.

2. Legal transitions and scope of the 2029 framework

Article 17 establishes the treatment of participating units in the SCEE (Brazilian Electricity Regulatory System) after the transitional periods. Its § 1 provides for the application of tariff components not associated with the cost of energy to the active energy consumed from the grid and to usage or demand, according to the regulations of... ANEEL.

At the same time, it requires the deduction of benefits provided by micro and mini-generation to the electrical system. The application must preserve this link between charging and recognition of benefits.1

Article 27 establishes a progression for certain components of the distribution service, usually identified as Wire B, applicable to compensated active energy: 60% in 2026, 75% in 2027, and 90% in 2028. From 2029 onwards, item VII refers to the rule in Article 17.

The law does not end the sequence with a clause that simply prescribes 100% of Wire BThe description of the subsequent regime must incorporate the tariff universe and the legally foreseen abatements.2

Furthermore, there are treatments that deviate from temporal uniformity. Article 26 excludes the application of Article 17 until December 31, 2045, for beneficiary units linked to microgenerators and minigenerators covered by its requirements.

Maintaining this treatment requires verifying protocols, implementation conditions, and legal grounds for loss or limitation of benefits. Subsequent power increases, for example, require specific analysis of the expanded portion.3

Article 27, § 2, shifts the application of Article 17 to 2031 for units that filed access requests between the thirteenth and eighteenth months following the publication of the law.

Paragraph 1 also provides a specific regime for certain mini-generation plants above 500 kW, from non-dispatchable sources, in remote self-consumption or shared generation with concentrated participation under the conditions defined therein.2

A combined reading reveals that the reference to 2029 is insufficient to characterize a portfolio of power plants. The first analytical step consists of identifying the documentary and regulatory status of each project, including its type, power output, and history of changes.

A projection that assigns the same transition date to all assets may distort cash flow even before any discussion about the future methodology.

Temporal protection does not equate to a complete freeze on the energy bill. Billing elements and conditions stipulated in applicable legislation and regulations remain relevant. This distinction prevents the preservation of a particular compensation regime from being presented as an absolute guarantee of savings or financial return.

3. Valuation guidelines and methodological choices

The CNPE (National Council for Energy Policy) established guidelines through Resolution No. 2, of April 22, 2024, published on May 7 of that year. The regulation requires consideration of effects on networks, losses, operation, charges and investments, as well as location, simultaneity, seasonality and consumption and injection times.
It also calls for attention to the differences between generation near the load and remote generation, and between dispatchable and non-dispatchable sources.4

The resolution determines the consolidation of positive and negative effects in net value applicable to billing. It limits discounts to the sum of tariff components not associated with the cost of energy and allows for the aggregated consideration of units with similar characteristics.

It requires avoiding duplication in accounting, making databases and calculation records public, and providing for periodic review.4

These commands define criteria, but they don't deliver the monetary result of each project in isolation. It's necessary to choose references, parameters, aggregation methods, and procedures for incorporating them into revenue. The analytical consequence is that knowing the guidelines isn't enough to assign a fixed economic value to the compensated surplus for the entire lifespan of the project.

Technical Note SEI No. 958/2026/MF, presented in the context of the Public Consultation ANEEL Bill No. 23/2025 examines two approaches: tariff differentiation, which incorporates costs and benefits into tariff construction, and an aggregate approach, which uses monetary valuation and discounts.

The statement discusses compatibility with tariff processes, double counting, and transparency. It is an institutional contribution to the debate, not a regulatory decision. ANEEL.5

From the perspective of this article, the quality of the methodology should be evaluated by the consistency between the physical effect attributed to the generation and its economic expression.

When calculations recognize reduced losses or postponed reinforcements, for example, they need to allow for verification of the assumptions used. Similarly, costs attributed to generation require justification. Transparency is essential for discussing results without replacing evidence with generalizations.

Temporal and locational criteria allow for the formulation of hypotheses regarding the relevance of adjustments in consumption and operation, but do not authorize anticipating differentiated remuneration for a specific project. The adoption of storage should be examined in terms of its costs, losses, operation, and access conditions. It cannot be concluded, solely from the 2029 benchmark onwards, that batteries will guarantee a return or more favorable tariff treatment.

4. Economic viability and contractual distribution of risk

Investment analysis should separate the legal framework from the economic assumptions. It is recommended to distinguish the transition period from the subsequent period, record the sources used, and assess the sensitivity of the results to the unit economy considered. Favorable, intermediate, and conservative scenarios are management tools; they are not tariff forecasts that... ANEEL will adopt.

It is also necessary to distinguish between physical generation, effectively compensated energy, and net savings. As a proposed analysis, savings should be estimated by the difference between the reference expenditure without the project and the expenditure with the project, for the same consumption and period, less any relevant additional costs.

This comparison requires documenting rates, operating expenses, and compensation criteria, avoiding double counting of the same benefit. Without specific case data, it is not appropriate to indicate payback or percentage return.

In a contract, the central problem is the distribution of the impact of any regulatory change on the economic commitments undertaken. In a power plant lease, for example, the repercussions may depend on the rent, the management model, and the agreed-upon obligations.

In shared generation relationships, it is also important to understand how the reduction in savings would affect beneficiary participation and the cost of the infrastructure. These repercussions are analytical possibilities to be verified in each business.

It is recommended to define the event that may trigger a review, the documentation required to demonstrate the impact, the negotiation procedure, and the limits of any potential adjustment. It is advisable to distinguish between regulatory changes, ordinary tariff variations, and operational performance.

An overly open clause can shift risks indiscriminately; another that is too rigid can hinder adaptation. Neither of these recommendations implies an automatic right to review or termination.

5. Conclusion

The 2029 benchmark must be understood through the combination of framework, transition, and tariff methodology. The legislation establishes the application of Article 17 in relevant situations and requires the recognition of systemic benefits.

The CNPE has already established guidelines, but translating these guidelines into revenue requires verifiable operational criteria. The alternatives contained in the technical opinions should not be communicated as definitively approved rules.

The conclusion is that preparation for the post-transition period begins with the present decision: consistent documentation, explicit assumptions, sensitivity scenarios, and contracts that regulate risk distribution.

Predictability depends both on regulatory action and the quality of information provided to investors. Projecting returns without clarifying the treatment adopted after the transition compromises the ability to evaluate the proposal and compare alternatives.

Source notes

1. BRAZIL. Law No. 14.300, of January 6, 2022. Updated text. Art. 17, caput and §§ 1 to 4. Chamber of Deputies. Available at: https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/2022/lei-14300-6-janeiro-2022-792217-normaatualizada-pl.html. Establishes the basis for tariff treatment subsequent to transitions and the competence for valuing benefits.
2. BRAZIL. Law No. 14.300/2022. Updated text, art. 27, items IV to VII and §§ 1 and 2. Same address as note 1. Justifies the progression from 2026 to 2028, the reference to art. 17 in 2029, the special regime for certain power plants above 500 kW, and the application in 2031 for the specific range of protocols.
3. BRAZIL. Law No. 14.300/2022. Updated text, art. 26, heading and §§ 1 to 4. Same address as note 1. Establishes the protection until 12/31/2045 and its conditions, limitations and grounds for termination. Eligibility requires analysis of the project documents.
4. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR ENERGY POLICY. Resolution No. 2, of April 22, 2024. Official Gazette of the Union, May 7, 2024, section 1, p. 8. Articles 1 to 4. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-br/assuntos/conselhos-e-comites/cnpe/resolucoes-do-cnpe/2024/Res_2_2024publicada.pdf. Guidelines for the costs and benefits of distributed generation, net value, limits, publicity and periodic review.
5. BRAZIL. Ministry of Finance. Secretariat of Economic Reforms. Technical Note SEI No. 958/2026/MF. Process 19995.013523/2025-55. Especially items 7 to 11 and 13 to 26. Statement on the Public Consultation. ANEEL No. 23/2025. Available at: https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/composicao/orgaos/secretaria-de-reformas-economicas/manifestacoes-em-consultas-publicas-de-orgaos-reguladores/2026/agencia-nacional-de-energia-eletrica-aneel/sei_58000857_nota_tecnica_958-1-_260325_090518.pdf. Technical contribution document, without the force of approval of the tariff methodology.

The opinions and information expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the author. Canal Solar.