LRCAP: Debate on thermal power plants should not be reduced to price versus safety.

An official document attributed to the MPTCU (Public Prosecutor's Office at the Federal Court of Accounts) opens a new front of questioning regarding the 2026 LRCAP (Capacity Reserve Auction), considered one of the largest auctions ever held in the Brazilian electricity sector.

Dated June 3rd and addressed to Minister Jorge Oliveira, rapporteur of TC 008.289/2025-5, The document states that Deputy Attorney General Lucas Rocha Furtado is revising his previously expressed position after receiving a memorandum entitled "Technical, Regulatory and Legal Statement in Defense of the Soundness of the 2026 Capacity Reserve Auction".

The most sensitive point lies in the explicit admission that there may have been an error in giving predominant weight to the price paid by consumers to the detriment of the safety and stability of the electrical system. The change in understanding, in itself, may be legitimate.

What needs investigation is the motivation: 

• Who produced the memorial?
• Was it presented by a public body, industry association, winning company, contracted firm, or agent with an economic interest in the outcome?
• What technical data was able to alter the previous reading?
• Does the appeal change previous requests or merely supplement the process?
• Is the inspection already authorized by the TCU still fully valid?

The topic is relevant because LRCAP is not a typical energy purchase. In simple terms, the auction contracts for power: power plants are compensated for being available and supplying the system during critical times.

This reserve may be necessary for the reliability of the SIN (National Interconnected System). However, its cost is shared among consumers, including free market consumers and self-producers, in the portion connected to the SIN. Therefore, the technical discussion is not about "price versus security".

The correct debate involves security of supply, affordable tariffs, competition, effective delivery capacity, environmental impact, and regulatory governance. There is a relevant institutional context.

In April, the TCU (Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts) denied the precautionary suspension of the auction, but authorized an inspection to further investigate the evidence presented in the process, including regarding ceiling prices, low competitiveness, economic and financial capacity, the background of the winning bidders, and any potential corporate ties.

Folha itself reported that one of the Court's concerns involved the possible participation of "paper generators," an expression used in reference to companies that would win bids without the real capacity to execute the projects.

A ANEEL On May 21st, the agency approved the products related to deliveries in 2026, stating that there were no judicial, administrative, or external control impediments preventing approval. According to the agency, the March auctions negotiated 18,97 GW in the 2nd LRCAP, with investments of R$ 64,5 billion and a discount of 5,52%.

The public question now is straightforward: does a subsequent official communication, attributed to the MPTCU (Federal Public Prosecutor's Office for the Court of Accounts), reduce, relativize, or merely re-evaluate the previous questions? Will the aforementioned memorandum be made public? Was there a process of rebuttal with consumers, industry, sector entities, and other interested parties? Do the TCU (Federal Court of Accounts) and the MPTCU confirm the authenticity of the document and the procedural scope of the new statement?

The timing of the topic's circulation is also noteworthy, following Corpus Christi and a Friday designated as an optional holiday on the federal calendar. This does not prove any irregularity.

Nevertheless, in a matter with the potential for billions of dollars in economic and tariff impact, the eventual disclosure during a period of low public attention reinforces the need for active transparency.

Journalistic interest, therefore, does not depend on proving fraud, collusion, or regulatory capture. The agenda is more objective and legally sound: an external oversight authority allegedly revised a relevant position in a multi-billion dollar case after a memorandum whose author is not identified in the body of the document under analysis.

Society has the right to know who presented the arguments, what data supported the change, and what remains under investigation.

Key questions for the investigation:

• Do the TCU and MPTCU confirm the authenticity of Official Letter No. 32/2026 (GAB) and the verification code provided in the document?
• Who drafted and filed the memorandum mentioned in the official letter?
• Was the memorial submitted by a public official, the winning company, an industry association, a private firm, or a third party?
• Were there any meetings, phone calls, in-person meetings, or informal communications prior to the change in position?
• What technical studies supported the review, and why are they not summarized in the body of the document?
• Does the inspection authorized by the TCU remain with the same scope?
• Have the questions regarding price ceilings, competition, delivery capacity, and corporate ties been resolved, or are they still pending?
• What is the estimated final impact for captive consumers, free consumers, and self-producers?
• Was the environmental analysis considered in the official letter documented? By whom?
• Does the official document have a concrete procedural effect or is it merely an argumentative supplement to the case file?

The opinions and information expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the author. Canal Solar.