Freedom of choice, new risks and new opportunities in the free market for low voltage.

1. Introduction

The Brazilian electricity sector is undergoing a structural transformation that goes beyond the traditional discussions about the generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization of electricity. Gradually, the role of the consumer within this structure is also being reshaped.

Historically, a large portion of Brazilian consumers have been linked to the Regulated Contracting Environment (ACR), in which energy is purchased through the distributor responsible for the concession area. However, the progressive opening of the Free Contracting Environment (ACL) has altered this logic by giving certain consumers the possibility of choosing their electricity supplier.

This movement reached a new stage with Law No. 15.269, of November 24, 2025, a law that promoted extensive modernization of the regulatory framework of the electricity sector and incorporated into Law No. 9.074/1995 instruments aimed at expanding freedom of choice, addressing market opening and creating the Supply of Last Instance – SUI.[1]

Decree No. 13.097, of August 12, 2026, fits into this context and regulates points necessary for the opening to reach consumers served at voltages below 2,3 kV.[2] The relevance of the Decree, however, should not be reduced to the dates established for liberalization.

Its most significant dimension lies in the attempt to create a regulatory architecture capable of allowing millions of consumers to effectively exercise their right to choose their energy supplier, without this transition compromising security of supply, the economic sustainability of distributors, consumer protection, or competition.

From this perspective, Decree No. 13.097/2026 can be understood as a transitional norm between two models: on the one hand, the model historically concentrated on the consumer-distributor relationship; on the other, a future retail market characterized by a plurality of suppliers, portability, the economical use of data, product diversification, and the increasing contractualization of energy consumption relations.

2. Opening up the low-voltage market and universalizing freedom of choice.

The first central point of Decree No. 13.097/2026 is the consolidation of the schedule for opening the market to consumers served at voltages below 2,3 kV.

The opening was structured in two stages. Starting November 25, 2027, industrial and commercial consumers served at low voltage will be able to exercise the option.

For other consumers, including residential ones, the opening is scheduled for November 25, 2028.[3] The setting of these dates produces consequences that go beyond the individual sphere of the consumer.

Up to this point in its opening, the Brazilian free market has been predominantly associated with business consumers with greater technical, economic, and negotiating capacity. The introduction of low voltage radically changes this reality.

The ACL (Advanced Consumer Care) market is progressively ceasing to be a market focused on specialized consumers and is moving towards becoming a true mass retail market. This phenomenon demands a shift in the regulatory paradigm.

In markets comprised of large consumers, a greater capacity for risk assessment, contract negotiation, and energy management is assumed. When freedom of choice extends to small commercial establishments and, subsequently, residential consumers, this premise ceases to be adequate.

Liberalization therefore requires specific mechanisms for protection, information, transparency, and comparability.

It is precisely at this point that one of the main conceptual merits of the Decree lies: implicitly recognizing that legally opening a market is different from creating conditions that allow consumers to rationally exercise their freedom of choice.

3. Retail representation and the new relationship between the consumer and the market.

Another key element is the consolidation of the retail agent's role as the main interface between the low-voltage consumer and the free market.

Consumers who opt for the ACL must be represented before the CCEE by a retail agent, with the consumer unit being served by a representative responsible for the respective load.[4] This structure is indispensable given the scale of the opening.

It would be operationally inadequate to require millions of residential consumers or small businesses to individually become CCEE agents, directly subjecting themselves to all the operational, financial, and regulatory complexities associated with accounting and settlement in the market.

The retailer, therefore, takes on an aggregating and representative role. However, this intermediary position also increases their responsibility.

The retail marketer ceases to perform a strictly negotiating function and assumes a position of permanent interface between the consumer, distributor, CCEE (Brazilian Chamber of Electric Energy Commercialization) and other market structures.

Consequently, issues such as customer service, contractual transparency, collections, default, data protection, risk management, compliance, and conflict resolution become central to the business model.

This movement is likely to produce a significant transformation in the profile of the trading companies themselves.

The competitive advantage will not be limited to the price of energy. User experience, technology, consumption management, quality of service, associated products, contractual clarity, and the ability to intelligently use data may become equally relevant elements.

4. Migration to the ACL: deadline, simplification and portability

The Decree also regulates the migration procedure. As a rule, the option must be communicated to the distributor at least 90 days in advance.

A ANEELHowever, it may establish a simplified procedure, including with a shorter timeframe, in addition to regulating mechanisms related to the portability of supply.[5]

Reducing the timeframe has practical relevance. Excessively long timeframes can act as a barrier to competition and reduce consumer mobility.

By allowing simplified procedures and the possibility of portability, the Decree brings the electricity sector closer to markets in which the ability to switch suppliers is an essential element of competition.

This aspect deserves special attention. Effective competition does not exist when the consumer formally has the freedom to choose, but faces excessive difficulties in switching suppliers.

The efficiency of the opening will therefore depend not only on the number of authorized marketers, but also on the existence of low transactional costs for entry, exit and replacement of the supplier.

The future regulation of ANEEL This will be crucial in determining whether portability will truly be simple or whether it will remain subject to procedures that could reduce its practical use.

5. The measurement cannot be used as a barrier to migration.

One of the most relevant provisions of the Decree refers to metering infrastructure. The rule establishes that migration may occur without the replacement of the existing metering system being a condition preventing entry into the free market.[6]

This regulatory choice is particularly important. While the digitization of metering and the widespread adoption of smart meters are desirable for the development of sophisticated tariff products, demand management, automation, and consumer response to economic system signals, conditioning the opening up to the universal replacement of equipment could significantly delay the process.

The Decree thus adopts a pragmatic solution: the absence of a smart meter cannot prevent the exercise of freedom of choice.

At the same time, the possibility of requesting the installation of more sophisticated equipment is foreseen, subject to applicable regulatory and infrastructure conditions. This option preserves immediate opening without abandoning the path of technological modernization.

In the medium and long term, however, the digitalization of measurement will continue to be a strategic issue. A truly dynamic market tends to depend on increasingly granular consumption data, allowing for the creation of time-of-use products, price responses, integration with storage, electric vehicles, and flexibility mechanisms.

The initial exemption from smart metering, therefore, should not be confused with the future irrelevance of smart metering.

6. Tariff benefits and the need for informed economic decision-making.

Freedom of migration does not necessarily mean that all consumers will have an economic advantage in the ACL.

The Decree also addresses the situation of consumers who benefit from certain tariff mechanisms existing in the regulated environment.

Benefits linked to the ACR will not necessarily be carried over to the free market, so the consumer will have to economically assess the convenience of switching.[7]

This aspect reinforces a relevant conclusion:

A free market is not automatically synonymous with tariff reduction. The result will depend on the consumption profile, commercial conditions offered, existing tariff benefits, representation costs, charges, taxes, contracted price, contract duration, and risks assumed.

From a legal standpoint, this increases the importance of the duty to inform. Low-voltage consumers will need to understand not only the nominal price presented by the supplier, but the overall cost of the decision. This scenario also calls for attention to advertising practices.

The simplified promise of a certain percentage of savings, unaccompanied by the necessary conditions for achieving it, could generate significant consumer and regulatory debate.

7. Return to the regulated market and predictability for distributors

The Decree also regulates the possibility of returning to the ACR. For low-voltage consumers, it establishes, as a rule, the need to notify the distributor one year in advance, with the possibility of reducing the deadline in certain circumstances or through regulation.[8]

The rule highlights the need for a balance between individual freedom and sectoral planning. The distributor purchases energy in advance to supply its regulated market.

If consumers can instantly join and return to the ACR (Advanced Contracting Regime), without predictability, contract planning may be compromised. Consequently, the return period acts as a stability mechanism.

From the consumer's point of view, however, the rule requires greater contractual maturity. Migrating to the ACL cannot be treated as a decision equivalent to simply changing service providers monthly.

The contract may have consequences for a significant period, making it essential to assess its duration, termination, guarantees, price exposure, renewal, and conditions for returning to the regulated market.

This gives rise to a new dimension of energy law and consulting: energy contracting now demands legal risk management on a much larger scale than that existing in the traditional regulated market.

8. The supplier of last resort as a market safety net.

Among all the regulated innovations, the Supplier of Last Resort – SUI is among the most important. Law No. 9.074/1995, after the amendments introduced by Law No. 15.269/2025, had already established the basis for this service, assigning it the purpose of guaranteeing service in specific situations in which the consumer is left without their representative or supplier in the free market.[9]

Decree No. 13.097/2026 details the mechanism and reinforces its emergency and temporary nature. The SUI should not be understood as a permanent substitute for energy contracting.

Its purpose is to prevent certain failures in the commercial arrangement from leaving the consumer without an immediate alternative for service.

Among the situations covered are events related to the termination of retail representation and the disconnection or loss of qualification of the responsible agent before the CCEE.[10]

The existence of the SUI reveals an essential difference between liberalization and deregulation. Opening the market does not mean withdrawing the state.

Conversely, the greater the freedom of choice, the greater the need for institutions capable of mitigating the consequences of market failures.

9. Swiss tariff and disincentive to stay

The economic architecture of the SUI (Unified Emergency Care System) was designed to prevent the emergency service from becoming a regular hiring alternative.

The regulation provides for a tariff logic that does not encourage the consumer to remain in this scheme for an extended period, and there may be progression over the service period.[11]

The rationale is clear. If the SUI (Unified Emergency Mechanism) offered permanently more advantageous conditions than those found on the market, consumers could be economically incentivized to remain in the emergency mechanism.

This would distort competition and transfer risks to the system. The tariff design must therefore simultaneously fulfill two functions:

To guarantee consumer protection in exceptional situations and encourage their rapid reintegration into the regular operation of the ACL or, as the case may be, their return to the ACR.

10. Who will provide the ultimate supply?

The Decree adopts an institutional transition. Until December 31, 2030, the provision of SUI will be linked to distributors, while from January 1, 2031, space is opened for other legal entities to perform the function, according to applicable regulations.[12]

This option demonstrates regulatory prudence. Distributors possess the infrastructure, reach, data, and established relationships with consumers in their concession areas, characteristics that justify their use in the initial phase of opening up the market.

In the long term, however, the possibility of participation by other agents allows for the construction of a more competitive and specialized structure. This transformation demonstrates that opening the market does not eliminate the role of distributors.

It alters the content of that role. The trend is for networking, marketing, retail representation, and last resort protection activities to acquire increasingly clear regulatory boundaries.

11. Allocation of SUI costs and risk socialization in ACL

Another particularly relevant aspect concerns the economic treatment of costs. The legislation establishes that the costs and financial effects related to the involuntary deficit of the Supplier of Last Resort should be shared among consumers in the Free Contracting Environment through a specific charge.[13] This topic deserves careful consideration.

Expanding freedom of choice creates individual benefits, but also demands collective safety mechanisms.

The SUI (Sustainable Industrial Unit) precisely represents this logic. The market creates a safety net and distributes its costs among those who are part of the environment benefited by the mechanism.

It will be essential, however, that the ANEEL Develop a transparent, predictable, and proportionate methodology for calculating and allocating these charges.

Otherwise, an instrument created to ensure stability could become a source of regulatory and tariff controversy.

12. Standard product, reference price and comparison of offers

Information asymmetry is probably one of the biggest challenges to opening up to residential consumers.

A large industrial consumer can maintain its own teams or hire specialized consultants to analyze energy contracts.

This reality cannot be assumed for millions of residential consumers.

Therefore, Law No. 9.074/1995 and the Decree advance the construction of mechanisms aimed at standardizing and comparing offers, including standard product and reference price, as well as centralized information instruments.[14]

CCEE plays an important role in this environment, including by providing mechanisms that can facilitate the identification of qualified agents and the comparison of commercial conditions.[15]

This is perhaps one of the most sophisticated elements of openness. Competition only functions properly when the consumer can compare alternatives.

A multitude of overly complex contracts, structured with different components and conditions, can create the appearance of competition without allowing for rational choice.

Standardization does not mean eliminating commercial freedom. It means creating a common minimum reference that allows the consumer to understand whether a given offer is actually more advantageous.

13. Data as the infrastructure of competition: the birth of "open energy"

Another strategic dimension of the Decree is related to consumer data. The regulation assigns importance to the sharing and processing of information, in conjunction with data protection legislation and the actions of the National Data Protection Authority – ANPD.[16]

This point could profoundly transform competition in the sector. In the future retail market, consumer data could be as valuable as the customer base itself.

Understanding time patterns, seasonality, demand profiles, and consumer behavior makes it possible to create customized products, make forecasts, structure efficiency solutions, integrate storage, electromobility, and distributed generation, and offer more sophisticated contractual models.

The fundamental regulatory issue will be ensuring that data is not used as a barrier to entry.

Distributors hold historical consumer information by virtue of providing the public service of distribution. If agents within the same economic group obtain unfair competitive advantages from this position, it may compromise competitive equality.

On the other hand, indiscriminate sharing would also be legally incompatible with the protection of privacy. The solution will depend on a balance between three values: protection of personal data, consumer freedom, and competition.

This gives rise to what tends to be called open energy: the creation of an ecosystem in which consumers can authorize the secure circulation of their data to obtain more competitive products and services.

14. Competition law and competitive neutrality

The opening of the low voltage also increases the importance of defending competition. The Decree reinforces regulatory powers aimed at preventing practices that could compromise competition in the retail market.[17] The concern is legitimate.

Distributors have a long-standing relationship with virtually all consumers in their respective concession areas. Companies belonging to the same economic groups can, in turn, engage in competitive marketing activities.

This scenario raises debates about the use of brands, the sharing of structures, information, employees, service channels, and the advantages arising from the position held in the monopolized distribution service.

There is no simple answer. Excessive restrictions can harm efficiency and limit legitimate business strategies.

Insufficient restrictions, however, may allow advantages derived from natural monopolies to be transferred to competitive markets.

Regulation should therefore aim for competitive neutrality, avoiding both protectionism and structural asymmetries. This debate should occupy a central position on the future regulatory agenda of... ANEEL.

15. Over-contracting by distributors and the cost of the transition.

The opening also produces an inevitable economic problem: distributors contracted energy in the past considering a certain number of consumers in the regulated market.

When consumers migrate to the ACL (Free Contracting Environment), a portion of that energy may no longer be needed to meet the ACR (Regulated Contracting Environment) demand. This creates the risk of over-contracting.

Law No. 9.074/1995, as amended by the 2025 reform, establishes treatment for the financial effects of over-contracting or involuntary exposure resulting from consumer migration.[18] The Decree assigns a relevant role to ANEEL in the regulation of the charges associated with this transition.

This point is particularly sensitive because opening up the market cannot create a situation where consumers who remain in the regulated market disproportionately bear the historical costs of a contracted structure for a market that has subsequently shrunk.

Similarly, it would not be economically sound to simply transfer all risks arising from a public policy of market opening defined after the contracts were signed to the distributors. The allocation of these costs is, therefore, one of the main economic challenges of the process.

16. The central role of ANEEL in building the new market.

Although Decree No. 13.097/2026 represents a significant step forward, a substantial part of the operational structure will still depend on sub-legal regulations.

It will be up to ANEEL To regulate aspects such as applicable tariffs in free and regulated environments; mechanisms related to the standard product; reference price; charges associated with opening; Supply of Last Resort; simplified migration procedures; portability; metering; billing; collection; data processing and sharing; competitive conditions; mechanisms aimed at protecting consumers.

This extensive agenda demonstrates that the Decree is less of an end point and more of a milestone in the regulatory transition.

The Agency will be responsible for transforming regulatory guidelines into operational procedures capable of functioning on a national scale.

And there is a particularly relevant variable: time. Regulation needs to be finalized with sufficient advance notice so that distributors, CCEE (Brazilian Chamber of Electric Energy Commercialization), retailers, consumers, and technology providers can adapt systems, contracts, and procedures before the opening. Legal certainty, in this case, also depends on regulatory predictability.

17. Consumer protection as a condition for the legitimacy of opening

The opening of the free market for low voltage brings about a profound conceptual change. For decades, a large part of Brazilian consumers practically did not need to understand how energy contracting works.

With liberalization, consumers gain the ability to choose suppliers, compare prices, interpret contracts, evaluate deadlines, understand readjustment mechanisms, and assume certain responsibilities.

Freedom is increasing. But so is complexity. Therefore, the expansion of ACL (Free Contracting Environment) to residential consumers should be accompanied by a new consumer protection agenda.

Loyalty clauses, termination fees, price adjustments, promotional pricing, indexation, commercial communication, handling of defaults, automatic renewal, data protection, and quality of service could constitute new sources of conflict.

In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the success of the opening will depend less on the number of consumers who migrate and more on the quality of the choices that these consumers are able to make.

Contractual freedom only produces consistent social benefits when accompanied by transparency, adequate information, and efficient dispute resolution mechanisms.

18. Conclusion

Decree No. 13.097/2026 represents one of the most significant steps in the recent evolution of the Brazilian electricity market.

Its importance, however, lies not only in confirming the dates for low-voltage consumers to enter the Free Contracting Environment. The Decree begins to establish the foundations of a true retail energy market.

Representation by retail agents, reduction and simplification of migration procedures, the prospect of portability, the possibility of using existing measurement systems, the planned return to ACR, the creation of the Supplier of Last Resort, the standard product, offer comparison mechanisms, data sharing, protection of competition, and the handling of opening costs are all parts of the same architecture.

The emerging model is substantially different from the one that has historically characterized the relationship between consumers and the electricity sector in Brazil.

The distributor will remain responsible for essential network infrastructure, but may cease to hold an exclusive position in energy contracting. The retail marketer will become one of the main commercial interfaces for the consumer.

CCEE will expand its institutional importance. ANEEL will assume even greater responsibility for market design and competition protection.

And the consumer will cease to be merely the recipient of a regulated tariff, becoming an economic agent capable of choosing products, suppliers, and contractual models. This transformation creates considerable opportunities.

New energy products may emerge. Measurement and management technologies will gain ground. Energy suppliers may compete for millions of consumers. Integrated solutions involving distributed generation, storage, electromobility, energy efficiency, and demand management could form a new ecosystem of services.

But there are risks. Information asymmetry, abusive business practices, economic concentration, anti-competitive use of data, overly complex contracts, and inadequate distribution of transition costs can reduce the expected benefits.

For this reason, openness should be understood as a process of regulated liberalization, and not simply as deregulation.

The fundamental question for the coming years is no longer whether the Brazilian market will be opened to low voltage. That decision has already been made. The question now is: what kind of market will be built from this opening?

The answer will depend on the quality of the regulations produced by ANEEL...regarding the institutional capacity of CCEE, the actions of economic agents, and, above all, the balance between freedom of choice, competition, legal certainty, and consumer protection.

The electricity sector of 2028, therefore, will not begin in 2028. Its legal, economic, and technological architecture is being built now.

Notes and references

[1] BRAZIL. Law No. 15.269, of November 24, 2025. Modernizes the regulatory framework of the Brazilian electricity sector and promotes changes, among others, in Laws No. 9.074/1995, No. 9.427/1996 and No. 10.848/2004. Presidency of the Republic.

[2] BRAZIL. Decree No. 13.097, of August 12, 2026. Regulates the opening of the electricity market for consumers served at voltages below 2,3 kV. Portal of Legislation of the Presidency of the Republic; Official Gazette of the Union, publication of August 13, 2026.

[3] The Decree maintains the opening schedule for low-voltage industrial and commercial consumers starting on November 25, 2027, and for other consumers, including residential ones, starting on November 25, 2028.

[4] The model foreseen for low voltage establishes mandatory representation before the CCEE by a retail agent and the linking of each consumer unit to the respective representative.

[5] The Decree establishes a minimum notice period of 90 days for notifying the distributor of the migration and authorizes the ANEEL to establish a simplified procedure, shorter timeframe, and rules related to portability.

[6] The replacement of the metering system shall not constitute a condition preventing migration to the ACL, preserving the possibility of adopting smart metering in accordance with applicable regulations and infrastructure.

[7] BRAZIL. Decree No. 13.097/2026. Rules relating to consumers benefiting from tariff mechanisms associated with the regulated environment and the effects arising from the option for the ACL.

[8] Low-voltage consumers who wish to return to the ACR must, as a rule, communicate their intention one year in advance, a period that may be reduced by the distributor or by the regulations of ANEEL.

[9] BRAZIL. Law No. 9.074, of July 7, 1995, especially articles 15-C and 15-D, as amended by Law No. 15.269/2025. The legislation governs the Final Appeal and the treatment of the financial effects associated with its opening.

[10] Decree No. 13.097/2026. Regulation of the cases of emergency and temporary assistance by the Supplier of Last Instance.

[11] Decree No. 13.097/2026. Tariff structure and temporary nature of the SUI, whose economic and financial regulation is attributed to ANEELLaw No. 9.074/1995 stipulates that the activity be remunerated by specific tariffs set by the Agency.

[12] Decree No. 13.097/2026. Transitional structure for the provision of Ultimate Supply, with distributors operating until the end of 2030 and the possibility of participation by other agents from 2031 onwards.

[13] BRAZIL. Law No. 9.074/1995, art. 15-C, § 2. The costs and financial effects resulting from the involuntary deficit of the SUI will be shared among consumers of the ACL through a specific tariff charge.

[14] BRAZIL. Law No. 9.074/1995. The legislation provides for the development of a standard product and its respective reference price in order to facilitate comparison between offers and increase transparency and simplicity for low-voltage consumers.

[15] Decree No. 13.097/2026. The structure of the opening includes instruments intended for informing and comparing the offers available to consumers, involving the actions of CCEE and regulation of ANEEL.

[16] BRAZIL. Law No. 13.709, of August 14, 2018 – General Law on the Protection of Personal Data – LGPD; Decree No. 13.097/2026. Data sharing in the context of openness must observe the applicable legal bases and regulatory action coordinated with the ANPD. The Decree associates non-discriminatory access to data with the promotion of competition.

[17] The Decree reinforces the regulatory role of ANEEL For the protection of competition and the prevention of anti-competitive conduct in the retail electricity market. The specific scope of these measures will be developed in the sub-legal regulations.

[18] BRAZIL. Law No. 9.074/1995, art. 15-D. The financial effects resulting from the over-contracting or involuntary exposure of distributors due to migration options are subject to a sharing mechanism provided for by law.

The opinions and information expressed are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the author. Canal Solar.